The Leverage Effect of Bank Disclosures
研究了信息披露如何影响银行的杠杆和风险，发现透明度提高可能促使银行增加短期债务，从而稀释保险存款并降低筛选激励，对审慎监管有重要启示。
ABSTRACT We study how disclosures affect banks’ leverage and risk. Banks screen borrowers and originate loans, partially financed using insured deposits. The possibility to sell loans before they mature incentivizes banks to lever up using uninsured short-term debt to dilute insured deposits. If markets are opaque, good loans trade at a discount, which limits banks’ use of short-term debt. If markets are transparent, prices compound information contained in disclosures, which leads banks to issue more short-term debt to further dilute insured deposits. We identify conditions under which the increase in leverage caused by disclosures reduces banks’ screening incentives. Our analysis has important implications for prudential regulation, including minimum regulatory capital requirements and leverage-based deposit insurance premiums. JEL Classifications: D80; G21; G14.