Multi-Metric Vesting Schemes in Executive Performance Equity Grants
研究了美国上市公司2006-2019年间高管绩效股权授予中单指标与多指标归属方案，发现绑定方案（要求同时达到盈利和非盈利目标）比加总方案更能限制高管对盈利指标的过度关注，降低通过盈余管理最大化授予收益的动机。
ABSTRACT Using a large sample of executive performance equity grants over 2006–2019, we provide a comprehensive representation of the single- and multi-metric vesting schemes used by U.S. public firms and investigate the incentives provided by alternative functional forms of vesting formulas that combine earnings with stock returns and other nonearnings targets. Our results indicate that, compared to earnings-vesting single- and multi-metric summative grants, binding schemes that require the contemporaneous achievement of both earnings and nonearnings targets for grant vesting limit executive fixation on earnings and the associated incentives to maximize grant payouts by managing earnings around the targets. The findings confirm the expectation of different incentive effects from alternative (linear versus nonlinear) aggregations of multiple performance targets in the grant vesting formulas, with binding schemes being more effective in mitigating the risk of executives prioritizing earnings relative to other targets in multi-metric grants. JEL Classifications: G34; J33.