CEO Compensation Changes Following Acquisitions
研究发现，只有在收购方使用股票作为支付方式时，CEO薪酬才会在收购后增加，且这种增加集中在风险较高的收购方和收购中，可能源于解决股票收购中特有的双向逆向选择问题。
Abstract We find that CEO compensation increases following acquisitions only in those deals in which acquirer stock is used as the method of payment. These compensation increases are driven by increases in equity-based compensation and are concentrated in riskier acquirers, in riskier acquisitions, and in acquirers whose CEOs have low exposure to the stock price. We find little support for traditional agency cost explanations of changes in CEO pay following acquisitions. However, our findings are broadly consistent with compensation changes representing a contracting solution to a two-sided adverse selection problem that is present only in stock acquisitions.