Consentient Votes With Reservation: Independent Directors’ Signaling Efforts
利用中国独立董事需发布意见报告的独特制度，研究发现独立董事意见报告的保守语气会引发负面市场反应，且该语气与公司未来业绩不佳相关，表明独立董事的信息传递角色可能重于监督角色。
Using China’s unique corporate governance structure, which mandates independent directors to publish opinion reports for approving specific transactions, we investigate how the tone of these reports affects market reactions to consentient votes. Our findings reveal that investors respond negatively to a conservative tone, highlighting the information-dissemination role of independent directors. The negative market reaction is stronger when: (1) independent directors face a lower cost of acquiring information, (2) they have a greater incentive and ability to communicate relevant information to minority shareholders, and (3) the opinion report is longer, readable, and more forward-looking. Moreover, a conservative tone is associated with poor future performance at both the firm and transaction levels, suggesting that the informational role of independent directors may outweigh their monitoring role in the context of opinion reports. Our study enhances the existing literature by demonstrating that, in a weak institutional environment, independent directors can serve as a protective mechanism for investors by providing value-relevant information through their conservative-toned opinions on management proposals.