Subgame perfect Nash equilibria in large reinsurance markets
研究了一个由多家保险公司和再保险公司组成的再保险市场，将其建模为再保险公司先动的序贯博弈，刻画了子博弈完美纳什均衡并分析了帕累托效率，对再保险市场设计和监管有参考价值。
We consider a model of a reinsurance market consisting of multiple insurers on the demand side and multiple reinsurers on the supply side, thereby providing a unifying framework and extension of the recent literature on optimality and equilibria in reinsurance markets. Each insurer has preferences represented by a general Choquet risk measure and can purchase coverage from any or all reinsurers. Each reinsurer has preferences represented by a general Choquet risk measure and can provide coverage to any or all insurers. Pricing in this market is done via a nonlinear pricing rule given by a Choquet integral. We model the market as a sequential game in which the reinsurers have the first-move advantage. We characterize the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in this market in some cases of interest, and we examine their Pareto efficiency. In addition, we consider two special cases of our model that correspond to existing models in the related literature, and we show how our findings extend these previous results. Finally, we illustrate our results in a numerical example.