Treasury Market Dysfunction and the Role of the Central Bank
构建了一个模型，解释交易商、对冲基金和资产管理公司三类市场参与者的激励与约束如何导致国债市场脆弱性加剧，并随国债供给增加而更明显；模型还探讨了美联储应对未来市场失灵的最佳方式，强调其应与货币政策明确分离。
ABSTRACT: We build a simple model that shows how the incentives and constraints facing three key types of market players—broker-dealers, hedge funds, and asset managers—interact to create a heightened level of fragility in the Treasury market, and how this fragility can become more pronounced as the supply of Treasury securities increases. After validating a number of the model's empirical premises and implications, we ask what it can tell us about how the Federal Reserve might best address future episodes of market dysfunction. In so doing, we take as given that an important priority for any Fed response to Treasury market dysfunction is that it be clearly separated from anything having to do with monetary policy.