Order-to-Factoring financing decision-making in a reverse supply chain under blockchain: Nash bargaining and goal programming
研究了区块链应用于供应链金融时，核心企业主导下中小企业融资决策问题，提出纳什谈判和目标规划两种协调机制，分析区块链成本与信用水平对系统收益的影响。
The application of blockchain to supply chain finance (SCF) can, to a certain extent, solve the problems of expensive and difficult financing for the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) at the end of the supply chain. This paper develops a three-level game model with the core enterprise as the leader (retailer), SMEs as followers (supplier and manufacturer). It analyzes the investment cost threshold of the blockchain. Under the blockchain, this paper proposes a Nash bargaining mechanism and a goal programming coordination mechanism to allocate the total revenue. The research shows that under specific circumstances where blockchain costs are met, there is a consequential enhancement in the system revenue, coupled with a notable mitigation in supplier financing expenditures. Conversely, surpassing a designated threshold in blockchain costs precipitates a rise in retail prices and an ensuing loss in revenue. Secondly, when the creditworthiness of the SME supplier is at a medium-high level, the members’ adoption of the Nash coordination mechanism. When the creditworthiness is lower, the members’ adoption of the goal planning coordination mechanism is also lower. Finally, SMEs with more initial capital are more conducive to rapid enterprise development and enhancing their bargaining power to obtain more revenue.