Platform Disintermediation: Information Effects and Pricing Remedies
研究平台如何通过定价和信息手段应对卖家为逃避佣金而脱离平台的行为，发现高信息环境下平台可能提高佣金率，且不完全信息信号对平台有利。
Platform Disintermediation: Information Effects and Pricing Remedies In “Platform Disintermediation: Information Effects and Pricing Remedies,” S. Sekar and A. Siddiq analyze how platforms use pricing and informational levers to combat disintermediation, where sellers transact off-platform to avoid commission fees despite losing payment protection. The authors find that a platform facing a high threat of disintermediation may optimally raise its commission rates in a high-information environment, prioritizing revenue maximization from remaining secure transactions rather than preventing all off-platform transactions. Furthermore, they show that increasing sellers’ switching costs may actually reduce platform revenue by enabling sellers to pass the cost onto on-platform buyers via higher prices. The analysis also demonstrates that a platform can benefit from providing a partially informative signal about buyer riskiness, as full information reduces the value of the platform’s protection and strengthens the disintermediation incentive. Finally, whereas access-based pricing (upfront fees) prevents disintermediation, it may yield less revenue than commissions when seller quality is highly heterogeneous.