Experimental evidence on covert bargaining markets
通过实验室实验研究分散市场中玩家进行多次双边和多边交易的行为，提出一种隐蔽讨价还价协议，发现其相比无讨价还价机制使事后效率翻倍，但整体效率因买方讨价还价更激烈而受损。
We conduct a laboratory experiment to study a decentralized market where players engage in multiple (bilateral and multilateral) transactions. We propose a novel class of bargaining protocols that allow players to keep bid amounts shrouded from each other (covert bargaining). We show that these bargaining protocols double ex-post efficiency relative to a mechanism without bargaining, mainly to the benefit of players (particularly buyers) rather than the silent auctioneer. Aggregate efficiency nonetheless suffers from the fact that buyers bargain harder than sellers and that some players over-bargain to appropriate a larger share of the unknown surplus.