Misconduct complaints and agents’ incentives: Evidence from housing transactions
研究针对房地产代理人的不当行为投诉如何影响其自利动机，发现投诉促使代理人提高售价以维护声誉，从而缓解委托代理问题。
Abstract This article investigates the impact of misconduct complaints against agents on their self‐interested incentives and examines how agents attempt to shield themselves from the associated adverse effects on their reputations and career prospects. Our analyses using the real estate brokerage market in Quebec (Canadian province) support the conjecture that misconduct complaints incentivize agents to be less self‐interested, as reflected in a higher sale price. This helps to alleviate problems in principal–agent relationships if the agents believe their complaint records are likely to be known and considered unfavorable by future clients. The impacts are weakened by a decrease in such beliefs by agents, potential future losses, commissions retained, and complaint leniency.