Resisting Democratic Backsliding From Within the State: Environmental Politics in Bolsonaro's Brazil
研究了巴西中央银行、最高法院和亚马孙州长联盟等机构如何利用多中心治理机制抵制针对环境政策的反民主措施，揭示了分散的政治裁量权、官僚自主性和制度能力在维护民主中的作用。
ABSTRACT This article explores how polycentric governance systems can facilitate resistance to democratic erosion from within the state, bridging two lines of research: polycentricity and democratic backsliding. Such resistance materializes through three key mechanisms within polycentric arrangements: decentralized political discretion, bureaucratic autonomy, and institutional capacity. In conducting a critical event analysis of environmental politics in Brazil, we analyze the actions of the Brazilian Central Bank, the Supreme Court, and a consortium of Amazonian governors. Although these entities do not have specific environmental mandates, their varying degrees of discretion, autonomy, and capacity enabled them to resist antidemocratic measures targeting environmental policies while fragmenting authoritarian presidential power. By examining how the combination of these three elements influenced the levels of resistance to democratic backsliding in Brazil, our findings illuminate both the challenges and promises of polycentric governance systems in promoting democratic deliberation in policy‐making within democracies under threat.