Repugnant transactions: The role of agency and severe consequences
通过实验室实验和情境研究，探讨代理权受限和交易后果严重性如何影响人们对交易的厌恶感，为缓解市场反感提供政策启示。
Repugnance constrains market design because inacceptable or repugnant transactions must be avoided. To better understand what makes a transaction repugnant, we study two potential causes: limited agency, e.g., one party being forced to accept an offer, and severe consequences of the transaction. In a laboratory experiment, we find that spectators prohibit transactions with limited agency more frequently than with full agency, especially when the consequences are severe rather than mild. The main findings of the experiment are corroborated by a vignette study on the acceptability of kidney sales. The results point to policies that can mitigate repugnance.