You reap what you SEW: Rethinking how kinship shapes managerial alignment in family firms
整合代理理论与社会情感财富理论，提出家族企业治理的有效性取决于管理者与家族主导联盟的一致性，而非其家族身份，并探讨正式与非正式治理的选择如何平衡风险与控制。
Socioemotional wealth (SEW) theory has advanced our understanding of family-firm behavior by highlighting the importance of noneconomic goals such as legacy preservation and family control. However, this literature often assumes that family managers are aligned with these goals and thatnonfamily managers are not. This binary overlooks cases wherein nonfamily managers support SEW objectives and wherein family managers act in self-interest. The few works that acknowledge exceptions to this binary begin to address this complexity, though a more developed theoretical framework remains needed. In this paper, we integrate agency theory and SEW to offer a contingent framework for governance in family firms. We propose that effective governance depends not on family status but on a manager’s alignment with the family’s dominant coalition and on the choice between formal and informal governance, which together allow firms to balance risk and control while preserving socioemotional value.