Prioritization Competition in a Three‐Sided Shipping Market: A Tri‐Level Game‐Theoretic Approach
研究港口优先靠泊权对拥堵、竞争和社会福利的影响，发现双头垄断市场港口会优先小航运商，而碎片化市场不提供优先权，优先权虽能减少拥堵但可能损害竞争力强的港口并增加部分货主成本。
ABSTRACT With the rapid growth of trade and port services, competition among ports has intensified, leading to strategic measures such as berthing priority. This paper examines the impact of prioritization on port congestion, stakeholder competition, and social welfare in duopoly and fragmented carrier markets. Using a tri‐level game‐theoretical model, we analyze the equilibrium in a port‐carrier‐cargo‐owner system, focusing on the interactions between decisions of different stakeholders. Key findings include: (1) In a duopoly market, equilibria either show no priority or both ports prioritizing the smaller carrier, while in a fragmented market, the Nash equilibrium converges to not providing priority; (2) Priority solidifies carriers' competitive landscape, prompting fleet adjustments that improve efficiency and thus reducing congestion; (3) While priority can reduce congestion, it may also disadvantage the more competitive port and raise inter‐modal transportation costs for some cargo owners; (4) Priority brings benefits for ports in markets with stronger carrier market power but offers little advantage in perfectly competitive markets, aligning with the fact that prioritization is mainly observed in container markets.