Who Prices Credit Rating Inflation?
研究发现，信用评级机构对业绩敏感债务的公司降级更慢、更少，因为降级会提高其借款成本；发起银行会为评级机构的利益冲突定价，而二级市场参与者则不然。
Abstract Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are less likely and slower to downgrade firms with performance-sensitive debt (PSD) if these downgrades increase borrowing costs. This effect is stronger when CRAs rate their most profitable clients and is not driven by selection into PSD contracts, by borrowers adjusting their leverage, or by borrowers hiding information. Originating banks price the CRAs’ conflicts of interest and sell loans with more embedded conflicts more frequently. In contrast, secondary market participants do not price conflicts of interest to the same extent. The recent settlements between the major CRAs and the U.S. government do not prevent rating inflation.