Outcome destabilization
研究了博弈中一系列颤抖如何使某个结果不稳定，并用此概念刻画序列均衡和稳定结果，为信号博弈中的均衡筛选提供新视角，并简化了复杂博弈中策略稳定行为的分析。
In a game in extensive form, we say that a sequence of trembles destabilizes an outcome if there is no corresponding sequence of payoff perturbations and Nash outcomes converging to the outcome. We use equilibrium destabilization to characterize sequential equilibria and sequentially stable outcomes, and to reinterpret standard selection criteria in signaling games as a means of ruling out implausible equilibria by identifying destabilizing tremble sequences. We show that the existence of a maximally destabilizing sequence of trembles (destabilizing all outcomes but one) significantly simplifies studying strategically stable behavior in complex games such as finitely repeated games.