Emerging From the Shadows: Consequences of Position Disclosure in Corporate Bankruptcy
研究了强制披露债权人和股东经济利益的头寸信息如何影响美国破产法第11章破产结果，发现头寸披露缩短了破产案件时长和跨类别谈判时间，降低了破产后重犯率，且未减少委员会参与或债权交易。
ABSTRACT I examine how mandatory position disclosure of claimholders’ economic interests affects Chapter 11 bankruptcy outcomes. Exploiting a regulation that increased disclosure by creditors and equityholders on certain committees, I find that position disclosure is associated with a decrease in the length of bankruptcy cases, especially the duration of negotiations between claimholders across classes. Further, I show that position disclosure is associated with lower post-bankruptcy recidivism. Contrary to the concerns expressed by critics, I find little evidence that position disclosure reduced claimholders’ participation in committees or decreased trading in the market for bankruptcy claims. My findings highlight the overall benefits of position disclosure in facilitating negotiations during bankruptcy. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: D82; G33: G34; K22; M40.