The Leveraging Game: Corporate Response to Green Credit Policy
研究发现绿色信贷政策导致重污染企业通过杠杆操纵来应对，这虽短期提升财务灵活性，但长期增加违约风险，对金融稳定构成威胁。
ABSTRACT This study examines how heavily polluting firms strategically respond to green credit constraints, focusing on leverage manipulation as a key financial adjustment. Using a difference‐in‐differences (DiD) framework and a sample of Chinese listed manufacturing firms from 2007 to 2020, we find that green credit policies significantly increase leverage manipulation, particularly among firms with weaker external governance, tighter financing constraints, and lower growth potential. Although leverage manipulation temporarily enhances financial flexibility, it does not improve firms' underlying financial health and ultimately raises their default risk over time. These findings reveal the unintended financial consequences of green credit policies and underscore the need for stronger regulatory oversight to curb excessive leverage manipulation and safeguard financial stability.