Optimal Selling Mechanisms With Endogenous Seller Outside Offers
研究卖方可通过隐藏投资生成外部报价时的两阶段销售机制设计，发现最优机制中卖方努力取决于买方报告价值，且当买方虚拟价值低于外部报价时卖方接受外部报价并支付终止费。
ABSTRACT We examine a two‐stage selling mechanism design problem, where the buyer makes her report and the seller endogenously decides his effort (hidden investment) to generate a possibly better outside offer. The optimal mechanism shows that the seller's effort depends on the reported value of the buyer; a higher value lowers the seller's incentive to invest in the outside offer. After the price of the outside offer is realized, if the buyer's virtual value is less than the price, the seller takes the outside offer, and a termination fee equal to the virtual value is paid to the buyer.