Adversarial disclosure with cross-examination
研究法庭上双方当事人在交叉询问机制下的证据披露激励，发现无适当保障的交叉询问会降低裁判质量，而再询问可纠正其负面效应。
Abstract Two opposed parties seek to influence the court. They invest in gathering evidence and select what to disclose. The court then adjudicates. We compare this setting with one allowing cross-examination. A cross-examiner tests the opponent to persuade the court that relevant information was withheld. Cross-examination without appropriate safeguards is shown to be detrimental to the quality of adjudication. It shifts the risk of adjudication error from erroneously finding for the cross-examined to erroneously finding for the cross-examining party. That party therefore has less incentives to acquire evidence because the opponent can now also be countered through cross-examination. A potential cross-examined also has less incentives to gather evidence because there is now a smaller chance of prevailing. Adjudication is therefore less informed. We show that redirect examination (or substitutes such as court-led examination) plays an essential role in correcting undesirable effects. Together, cross and redirect efficiently extract information from a testifying party.