Defensive Compliance in Corporate Criminal Justice: Effects of Compliance Programs on Organizational Prosecution and Punishment
研究了合规计划是否通过影响起诉和量刑决策来减少企业刑事责任和惩罚，基于美国量刑委员会数据发现防御性合规效果有限且依赖情境。
ABSTRACT Business organizations have increasingly adopted compliance strategies in response to heightened regulatory requirements. Prior research has examined the role of compliance programs in curbing unethical behavior and enhancing corporate governance, but it has often overlooked their defensive function and proactive role in legal risk management. This paper develops the concept of defensive compliance and investigates whether compliance programs reduce corporate criminal liability and punishment through prosecutorial and sentencing decisions and outcomes. Analyses of US Sentencing Commission organizational offender data provide some evidence of defensive compliance: fewer conviction counts, reduced fines (only during the Biden administration), and shorter probation terms. However, its effects are muted or even reversed in other outcomes or contexts. The results also show little support for the propositions that public company status and managerial involvement moderate defensive compliance. These findings suggest that the efficacy of defensive compliance evolves over time and is highly context‐dependent. Future research should further develop the defensive compliance framework and examine its operation across varied institutional settings.