Deposit Inflows and Outflows in Failing Banks: The Role of Deposit Insurance
利用一家陷入困境银行的每日账户级数据，研究发现监管负面消息后未保险存款流出，但定期和临时存款保险减少了流出；同时，新保险存款流入在很大程度上抵消了未保险存款的流出，银行提高了定期存款利率，这削弱了存款人纪律。
ABSTRACT Using unique, daily, account‐level data, we investigate deposit outflows and inflows in a distressed bank. We observe an outflow of uninsured depositors following bad regulatory news. Both regular and temporary deposit insurance reduce outflows. We provide important new evidence that, simultaneous with deposit outflows, deposit inflows are first order. Uninsured deposit outflows were largely offset with new insured deposit inflows as the bank approached failure, with the bank increasing term deposit rates. This phenomenon holds in a large sample of banks that faced regulatory action, suggesting that insured deposit inflows are an important mechanism that weakens depositor discipline.