Stackelberg game policies in a supply chain with credit and inflation induced demand: nested use of a new ABC variant
研究了批发商-零售商-消费者供应链中，受价格、信用期和通胀影响的需求下，批发商作为领导者、零售商作为跟随者的Stackelberg博弈模型，并用改进的人工蜂群算法求解最优策略。
The Stackelberg game strategies are outlined for a wholesaler-retailer-consumer supply chain of an item in a finite planning schedule, where consumers’ demand is influenced by price, credit period, and inflation. As the profit of each party depends on the consumers’ demand, the retailer offers some credit period to its consumers and the wholesaler shares this burden by offering some credit period to the retailer. The retail price depends on the selling price of the wholesaler and both price are decision variables. It is also assumed that a portion of consumers are defaulters, and is increased with the length of the credit period. The model is formulated to optimise individual profits from the planning horizon following the Stackelberg game approach, where the wholesaler is the leader and the retailer is the follower. The performance of Artificial Bee Colony algorithm is enhanced by the introduction of four additional perturbation rules and their collaborative use following a Q-learning strategy. The algorithm is implemented, tested, compared with state-of-the-art algorithms, and applied in a nested way to determine the optimal policies of both players simultaneously. The model is illustrated using different numerical examples, and some managerial insights are outlined.