Calibration in policy design: rethinking targets of energy-efficiency rebates
研究通过分析Xcel能源公司在丹佛的住宅冷却回扣项目，发现政策校准（如承包商认证规则）不仅影响消费者，还重塑了承包商行为，从而改变政策实际作用对象。
Policy instruments are often presumed to shape a defined target population’s behaviour, yet the way those instruments are calibrated – their micro-characteristics and accountability rules – can alter who is governed. This article examines how calibration reshapes policy targets, using the case of Xcel Energy’s Quality Installation rebate programme for residential cooling in Denver, Colorado (2020–23). We show how rules that require certified contractors to follow specified installation practices transform a consumer rebate into an instrument that also targets contractor behaviour. Drawing on a mixed-methods design that combines qualitative analysis of regulatory documents with quantitative permit data, we find that programme partners install smaller, more efficient systems, at higher cost, and with fewer failed inspections than non-participants. These findings suggest that energy-efficiency rebates can influence contractor practice across all households, not only device choices by end users. We argue that overlooking calibration and the politics embedded in design obscures the behavioural and institutional pathways from policy action to outcome. By distinguishing between intermediate and end targets, we propose a conceptual refinement to policy design theory that is generalizable across policy domains where instrument calibration reshapes who policies act upon.