Channel structure of online retail platforms: impact of asymmetric information and capacity constraints
研究了制造商在产能信息不公开时，如何通过在线平台选择直销、转售或双渠道销售，发现高产能制造商从信息保密中获益，而低产能制造商则不然，且信息不对称可能提高消费者剩余。
When selling online, manufacturers can either sell directly to customers via the platform (agency channel), sell the platform their products (reselling channel), or engage in both channels simultaneously. Manufacturers typically operate with limited capacity, and this information is often not disclosed to platforms. Our study develops a screening game framework in which the online platform presents a menu of quantity-price pairs contracts to the manufacturer whose capacity information is private. The manufacturer then determines the quantity it will allocate to both channels, reselling and agency. We find the manufacturer prefers both agency and reselling channels under the asymmetric information game. We also show that a manufacturer with high capacity benefits from keeping its capacity information private, but a manufacturer with low capacity does not. Furthermore, the manufacturer and the platform may not benefit from more production capacity of the manufacturer and if capacity of the manufacturer is sufficiently low, then it may be advantageous for the platform not knowing the manufacturer’s capacity. Lastly, asymmetric information on capacity could lead to higher consumer surplus. Our study offers insights for manufacturers and online platforms, assisting them in making strategic decisions and navigating the dynamics of information sharing within the online retail landscape.