Bank Monitoring with On‐Site Inspections
利用非银团建设贷款的交易级数据，研究银行现场检查监控的驱动因素和后果，发现监控强度与贷款条件权衡，经济下行或银行财务不稳时监控加强，负面检查报告导致更多提款请求被拒，检查频率增加或威胁均降低违约率。
ABSTRACT Using proprietary transaction‐level data on nonsyndicated construction loans, we provide some of the first empirical evidence on the drivers and consequences of bank monitoring through on‐site inspections. Banks trade off monitoring intensity with favorable origination terms. Monitoring intensity escalates in response to local economic downturns or the bank's financial instability. Borrowers with negative inspection reports have more draw requests denied, suggesting that monitoring outcomes impact credit decisions. Both the occurrence and threat of increased inspection frequency correspond to reduced defaults. Overall, our results provide empirical support for a substantial body of theoretical literature on bank monitoring.