The paradox of judicial reforms in Latin America
研究了1900至2021年间约4000名拉丁美洲最高法院法官的退休模式，发现增强法院权力的改革反而通过促使法官辞职或扩大法院规模来创造职位空缺，从而削弱司法独立。
Abstract Conventional wisdom indicates that certain institutional reforms strengthen the judiciary, while others curb its authority. However, even court-empowering reforms can undermine judicial independence. Reforms often create new vacancies by prompting the resignation of sitting judges or expanding the size of the court. Judicial turnover thus creates opportunities for the reforming parties to appoint loyal judges. We document that court-empowering reforms produce judicial turnover by analyzing the retirement patterns of about 4000 justices who served in Latin American Supreme Courts and constitutional tribunals between 1900 and 2021.