Profitability of two-part tariffs in name-your-own-price markets
通过实验室和现场实验，研究了在消费者自主定价市场中收取小额不可退还竞价费（两部收费制）能否提高零售商利润，并发现消费者经验和决策辅助工具会削弱其效果。
Name-Your-Own-Price (NYOP) mechanisms offer retailers a participatory alternative to posted pricing by allowing consumers to bid on goods and services. We examine when and why charging a non-refundable bidding fee to submit a bid—a “two-part NYOP” mechanism—can improve retailer profitability. Across two incentive-compatible laboratory experiments and one field experiment, we assess the relative profitability of this mechanism compared with simple NYOP with zero bidding fee and document behavioral factors that moderate the relative profitability. We find that modest bidding fees can increase a NYOP seller’s profits; however, the extent to which they do so is moderated by 1) consumers’ experience with the mechanism and 2) the use of a decision aid that helps consumers with calculations. Both moderators reduce buyer participation to the point that a NYOP seller may no longer benefit from charging bidding fees. Thus, NYOP retailers may find bidding fees most effective as short-term promotions or membership benefits rather than permanent pricing strategies. Our field experiment corroborates that small, reasonable fees can raise profits in short-term sales campaigns, consistent with the laboratory evidence. Regarding the underlying consumer behavior, quantitative predictions of the existing risk-neutral theory do not align well with the observed behavior, even among experienced consumers. Risk-averse expected utility theory does not fit well either, because consumers exhibit a robust preference inconsistency previously documented in the literature.