Stress Test and Credible Information Disclosure
研究了金融监管机构在披露银行压力测试结果时面临的可信度挑战，发现通过向银行和储户披露不精确的结果区间，可以在不假设监管机构承诺诚实披露的情况下实现可信披露。
Abstract We model credibility challenges financial regulators often face when disclosing bank stress test results. Since disclosures influence banks’ risk-taking and depositors’ withdrawal decisions, regulators may have incentives to misreport. We show that regulators can reveal results credibly through imprecise disclosures to both banks and depositors. The regulator reveals only the range or the interval in which the result lies. Crucially, our findings indicate that stress test results can be disclosed credibly without assuming that the regulator is committed to truthful disclosure.