When are Customer Boycotts Permissible?
研究出于道德原因的消费者抵制，从消费者商业自由出发，提出区分允许与不允许抵制的框架，结论是个人道德抵制几乎从不道德上不允许。
Abstract This paper examines ethical customer boycotts, instances where individuals choose to boycott for ethical reasons. By focusing on the commercial freedom of the customer, it offers a new framework for distinguishing between permissible and impermissible boycotts. It concludes that individual ethical boycotts are almost never morally impermissible. The scope of the paper is limited. It does not attempt to answer the important question of when an individual boycott decision is objectively good or bad. Rather, it attempts to answer the prior question of when a decision to boycott—made by someone who believes their decision is morally right—is doing something that is morally permissible . In defending this position, the paper distinguishes between “objective ought” and moral permissibility. The paper argues that focusing on the right of a consumer to choose is the best way to approach the question, “May I boycott this product?” The approach shifts the emphasis in the boycott debate from prevailing frameworks based on democratic values, intentional harm, and libertarianism, toward a customer’s right to choose. It proposes a cosmopolitan interpretation that relies on the default right of market participants to refrain from commercial exchanges except under extraordinary circumstances. Among other benefits, this approach addresses gaps in alternative accounts that overlook a significant portion of customer boycott decision-making. The paper explains why the threshold for boycott impermissibility is very high: (1) because any claim of impermissibility must overcome the default presumption of freedom in commercial exchange; (2) because an unusual “hard duty” follows from a determination of boycott impermissibility; (3) because a boycotter’s true intent is difficult to discern; and (4) because boycotts serve as alternatives to violence. The account offered here implies that even decisions to boycott that are objectively wrong may be morally permissible. Finally, the paper shows why certain kinds of anti-boycott laws threaten an individual’s moral right to boycott.