Cartels within cartels: Business consortia, state power, and the economic field of cement in 1930s Czechoslovakia
本文结合商业史与布迪厄场域理论，分析1930年代捷克斯洛伐克水泥行业的卡特尔化，揭示企业如何利用国家防御需求将经济资本转化为对专家、官员和媒体的象征性影响。
The article integrates the business history discourse on market collusion with Pierre Bourdieu’s social field theory to analyse the cartelisation of the cement industry in 1930s Czechoslovakia. During this period, the government’s decision to construct concrete fortifications for defensive purposes effectively designated cement plants as a strategic economic resource, thereby facilitating their capacity to tailor state interventions and modify the rules of market competition. The article utilises archival sources of cement companies, cement cartel headquarters, affiliated banks, and state offices to demonstrate the interlinking of the market collusion with a broader social and power matrix. By analysing the cement cartel’s ability to convert its members’ capital into symbolic influence over experts, state officials, politicians, and journalists, the article contributes to ongoing debates about the effect of external phenomena, such as media propaganda, the organisational role of banks, or national security interests, on market collusion.