Evolutionary stability and tenable strategy blocks
分析了有限两人博弈中演化稳定性与Myerson和Weibull提出的可维持策略块之间的关系，证明了对均衡进入者稳健的策略完全符合可维持性，并提出了直接刻画可维持策略块的新演化稳定性概念。
Abstract We analyze relationships between evolutionary stability and the tenable strategy blocks of Myerson and Weibull (Econometrica 83(3): 943–976). In finite two-player games, we prove that strategies robust against equilibrium entrants (Swinkels, J. Econ. Theory 57(2):306–332) are fully settled in the sense of Myerson and Weibull. Based on this, we propose new evolutionary stability concepts that characterize tenable strategy blocks directly. These characterizations are formulated solely in terms of primitives without relying on tenability’s meta game framework, simplifying the application of tenability and comparisons with other concepts. For instance, we prove that every coarsely tenable block contains a strategically stable set (Kohlberg and Mertens, Econometrica 54(5):1003–1037). Finally we show that in finite and symmetric two-player games, established evolutionary stability notions imply a symmetric variant of coarse tenability.