Stricter margin squeeze regulation to achieve non-discrimination in digital markets
研究了数字市场中利润率挤压监管的严格程度如何影响下游竞争、产品多样性和零售价格，发现更严格的规则不会促进批发接入竞争，与直接批发价格上限不同。
Non-discrimination clauses are once again central in digital markets, echoing the 1990s debates on telecom liberalization and resurfacing in later discussions on net neutrality. In practice, they often appear as margin squeeze regulations, requiring vertically integrated firms to offer wholesale access with a minimum margin between retail and wholesale prices—the margin’s size determining the rule’s strictness. We show that binding margin squeeze constraints can soften downstream competition, creating a trade-off between product variety and retail prices for both total and consumer welfare. Stricter rules, however, do not spur wholesale access competition, unlike direct wholesale price caps. These results have important implications for telecom and digital market regulation, where regulation of gatekeepers is tightening.