Adaptation in Target-Based International Environmental Agreements
研究了适应投资对自下而上型国际环境协定（如巴黎协定）的影响，并与联合决策型协定对比，发现协定结构对减排、适应和参与度的作用不同。
Abstract In this paper, we examine the impact of adaptive investments on international environmental agreements that, like the current Paris Agreement, have a bottom-up nature, with signatory countries committing to a common emission target (T-agreement). Furthermore, we contrast the effectiveness of the T-agreement with that of an agreement in which signatory countries act as a coalition and make their decisions jointly (J-agreement). Under a T-agreement, the strategic relationships between countries’ emissions, as well as between adaptation and mitigation, align with the results found in the literature on J-agreements. However, the impact of adaptation and of the number of countries participating to the agreement differ significantly. These results offer new insights into the interplay between emissions, adaptation, and participation in the context of international environmental agreements, and they highlight the critical role played by the agreement’s structure and substance.