Strategic Use of Ad Hoc Commissions for Blame Avoidance: Evidence From Chile
研究了智利政府如何在危机中策略性地使用专家委员会来规避指责，发现总统支持率低和频繁危机事件时更常用委员会，但持续或严重事件时使用减少。
ABSTRACT Ad hoc commissions are well known in policymaking, yet their strategic deployment during crises remains less understood. This study examines how governments rely on expert commissions to manage blame and political risk in response to critical events. I argue that while commissions facilitate blame avoidance, their use is constrained when delegating authority to experts poses greater risks than benefits. Using logit models on longitudinal data from Chile (1990–2022), I assess how critical events affect commission appointments. The study draws on a novel dataset constructed through archival research and develops an original indicator of critical events using billions of media records from Google Jigsaw's Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT). The findings reveal a conditional logic: high presidential disapproval and frequent critical events are associated with greater use of commissions, whereas sustained or severe events are linked to lower use. These results suggest that the deployment of expert commissions as a blame avoidance strategy is conditional on governments' political risk calculus.