From Interaction to Business Fluctuations: How Credit Network Explains Cycles
通过构建异质性主体宏观经济模型，研究美国经济中资本流动的动态特性，发现高度集中的金融部门内生形成会引发严重金融危机，导致银行间市场冻结、信贷中断和深度衰退。
Abstract We investigate the dynamic properties of capital flows in the U.S. economy by developing and estimating a heterogeneous agents macro‐economic model in which credit, deposits, and interbank relations evolve endogenously through optimal decentralized choices under limited information. Our findings suggest that severe financial crises stem from the endogenous formation of a highly centralized financial sector. In this setting, a self‐reinforcing bank run against systemic intermediaries, although rare, can freeze the interbank market, disrupt a large share of credit lines, and trigger a deep recession. These results underscore the need for prompt policy intervention to prevent cascading effects and costly bailouts.