How to Allocate Money?
研究一个公平与效率的权衡问题：设计者只能通过让受助者参与排队等无效率活动来筛选出真正需要资金的人，发现当低成本的受助者预期资金价值超过平均值两倍以上时，这种筛选机制优于直接发放一次性补贴。
I study a simple equity-efficiency problem: A designer allocates a fixed amount of money to a population of agents differing in privately observed marginal values for money. She can only screen by imposing an “ordeal”—that is, by allocating more money to agents who engage in a socially wasteful activity (such as queuing or filling out forms). Giving a lumpsum transfer is outperformed by an ordeal mechanism when agents with the lowest money-denominated cost of engaging in the wasteful activity have an expected value for money that exceeds the average value by more than a factor of two.