The Limits of Limited Commitment
研究了领导者行动空间被一组子集覆盖时，其承诺机会受限制的情况，刻画了所有可能承诺结构下的结果，并应用于双寡头模型，找出使消费者或生产者最优的承诺结构。
We study limited strategic leadership. A collection of subsets covering the leader’s action space determines her commitment opportunities. We characterize the outcomes resulting from all possible commitment structures of this kind. If the commitment structure is an interval partition, then the leader’s payoff is bounded by her Stackelberg and Cournot payoffs. Under general commitment structures, the leader may obtain a payoff that is less than her lowest Cournot payoff. We apply our results to a textbook duopoly model and characterize the commitment structures leading to consumer- and producer-optimal outcomes.