Plata y Plomo: How Higher Wages Expose Politicians to Criminal Violence
利用断点回归设计，研究发现更高工资的意大利政客更可能促进采购透明与竞争，但也更易遭受犯罪攻击，表明高工资在抑制腐败的同时可能引发暴力作为替代手段。
What is the effect of politicians’ wages on corruption in the presence of criminal groups that use both bribes and violence? With a regression discontinuity design and three distinct proxies for corruption, we show that better-paid Italian politicians are more likely to promote transparency and competition in procurement but also more likely to incur criminal attacks. The effects of wages, which subside after three years, are driven by changes in incumbents’ behavior rather than improved selection. These findings show how higher wages may curb corruption, but also foster the use of violence as an alternative tool to influence policymaking.