Bargaining game analysis for performance-based maintenance contract decision-making of offshore wind turbines
研究了风机制造商和风电场运营商如何通过三轮讨价还价博弈模型，以发电量为绩效标准签订维护合同，平衡双方利益并确保风机可用性。
Manufacturers of wind turbines and operators of wind farms are the two primary participants in the operation and maintenance of offshore wind farms. In this study, a three-round bargaining game model is proposed to conduct a performance-based maintenance contract (PBMC) from view of the above two participants. Initially, a preventive maintenance model is established to select an appropriate maintenance method according to the maintenance efficiency. Moreover, repetition learning effect and failure learning effect are taken into account, since they are closely related to the required maintenance cost and maintenance efficiency. On this basis, a corresponding PBMC is constructed to minimise maintenance cost, where power generation is taken as the performance standard for incentive or penalty. Furthermore, a bargaining game model is established, incorporating the respective priority-bidding scenarios of both participants. The game equilibrium is gained on this basis. A case study is conducted to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. The results indicate that the proposed game model can balance the profits and conflicts between the two participants effectively, and the wind turbine’s availability can be ensured accordingly. Moreover, sensitivity analysis is carried out, and it shows that the learning effect has a significant impact on the maintenance cost.