Competition under Incomplete Contracts and the Design of Procurement Policies
利用美国国防采购中一项要求公开合同机会的法规变化，研究发现扩大竞标者范围虽降低中标价，但导致成本超支和延误等事后绩效恶化；通过估计模型，提出简单调整现行法规可显著节省采购支出。
We study the effects of intensifying competition for contracts in the context of US Defense procurement. Leveraging a discontinuous regulation that mandates agencies to publicize certain contract opportunities, we document that expanding the set of bidders reduces award prices but deteriorates post-award performance in terms of cost overruns and delays. We develop and estimate an auction model with endogenous entry and stochastic execution performance, in which the buyer endogenously chooses the intensity of competition. Model estimates indicate substantial heterogeneity in performance across contractors and show that simple adjustments to the current regulation could provide significant savings in procurement spending.