Who hires whom? connected hiring in the CEO labor market
研究发现近三分之一的外部继任CEO与公司外部董事存在关联，这种关联雇佣在信息不透明公司和资历较浅的CEO中更常见，且关联CEO能提升公司价值、初始薪酬更低，匹配质量不逊于非关联CEO。
Close to one in three external CEO successors is connected to the hiring firm’s outside directors—a much higher frequency than expected. Connected hirings are particularly pronounced among informationally opaque firms and less established CEOs. Consistent with rent sharing, connected CEOs enhance firm value relative to unconnected CEOs, and they receive lower initial compensation, although the pay differential subsequently dissipates. Finally, the firm-CEO matching quality of connected CEOs is at least comparable to that of unconnected CEOs as both display similar separation rates. Overall, our findings suggest that connected hirings alleviate bilateral information asymmetry in the CEO labor market.