Anticipating nightmare issues: explaining the timing of negative agenda-setting by interest groups
基于485个欧盟利益集团的调查数据，研究发现经济资源丰富、专业化程度高且经常外包政策工作的组织更可能主动游说以阻止其“噩梦”议题进入正式议程，而弱势集团则因难以提前识别威胁而被动应对，揭示了政治动员中的时机差距及其对民主治理的影响。
This paper investigates the timing of interest groups’ negative agenda-setting efforts. Some organizations lobby proactively to prevent their ‘nightmare’ issues from reaching the formal policy agenda, whereas others mobilize only once such issues have already been advanced by rival stakeholders. Drawing on the anticipatory governance literature, I argue that a group’s propensity for proactive lobbying depends on its ability to detect and evaluate potential policy threats in advance. I expect that economic resources, professionalization, and the outsourcing of policy work enhance an organization’s anticipatory capacity and thus increase the likelihood of proactive engagement. Using novel survey data from 485 EU-level interest groups and their most feared nightmare issues, I find that affluent and professionalized organizations that frequently outsource policy work are more likely to lobby proactively. By contrast, the findings suggest that less advantaged groups struggle to recognize threats early and therefore tend to engage reactively. The results reveal a timing gap in political mobilization: organizational inequalities shape which groups can intervene early to protect their constituents’ interests. This gap carries important implications for democratic governance, as the unequal distribution of anticipatory capacity may distort political representation at the earliest and potentially most consequential stage of the policymaking process.