The Social Structuring of Digital Monitoring: How Resource‐Rich Employees Are Shielded From More Invasive Levels of Digital Monitoring
基于德国雇主-雇员匹配调查数据，研究发现资源丰富的组织和岗位中的员工较少经历基于工作步骤自动存储数据的绩效评估，也较少将数字监控视为持续监视，但这一模式不适用于基础数据存储层面。
ABSTRACT Digital monitoring represents a new dimension of external control. We focus on variation in the experiences and perceptions of digital monitoring among employees with differing access to resources due to their embeddedness in differentially resource‐rich organizations and jobs. Based on German linked employer–employee survey data, our results suggest that employees in resource‐rich organizations that are able and willing to pay relatively high wages to secure work performance are less likely to experience the use of automatically stored data on work steps for performance evaluation and to perceive digital monitoring as constant surveillance. The same is true of employees in resource‐rich jobs with high task complexity. These patterns did not emerge for the mere automatic storage of data about work steps, which suggests that—in contrast to more invasive levels of digital monitoring—employees' experiences of this basic level are less likely structured by their embeddedness in organizational inequality regimes.