Lemonade from lemons: Information design and adverse selection
研究卖方定价时，不同信息结构下买卖双方的收益可能，发现简单可行性和个体理性约束就能确定收益集合，买方可能获得全部剩余，且非信息机制通常无法扩大收益集合。
A seller posts a price for a single object. The seller's and buyer's values may be interdependent. We characterize the set of payoff vectors across all information structures. Simple feasibility and individual‐rationality constraints identify the payoff set. The buyer can obtain the entire surplus; often, noninformational mechanisms cannot enlarge the payoff set. We also study payoffs when the buyer is more informed than the seller, and when the buyer is fully informed. All three payoff sets coincide (only) in notable special cases—in particular, when there is complete breakdown in a “lemons market” with an uninformed seller and fully informed buyer.