The (In)effectiveness of Targeted Payroll Tax Reductions
利用意大利行政数据，研究针对学徒合同的工资税减免政策对劳动力需求的影响，发现该政策并未有效刺激新增就业，而是补贴了原本就会发生的雇佣，成本效益不佳。
Abstract This paper studies the cost-effectiveness of targeted payroll taxes for stimulating labor demand. It uses rich administrative data to study the effects of an Italian reform that raised social security contributions for apprenticeship contracts but granted a substantial discount for firms with 9 employees or less. The discount does not increase demand for apprenticeship contracts. Instead, it subsidizes inframarginal hiring. This reform is not cost-effective. Point estimates imply that each million euros of foregone social security contributions supports the employment of 29 apprentices for one year and no permanent contracts (these estimates are not statistically different from zero).