Strategic exits in stochastic partnerships: The curse of profitability
研究随机产出合作中玩家可策略性退出搭便车，发现当搭便车激励足够大且相互依赖中等时，产出增加反而可能损害所有玩家，即盈利性诅咒。
We study dynamic partnerships where the output evolves stochastically, each player can exit at any time, and players who have exited continue to accrue some benefits if the remaining players keep contributing to the partnership. Players can strategically exit to free‐ride on their partners' contributions, knowing that it may trigger subsequent exits of their partners. We characterize the unique Pareto‐optimal equilibrium. When players have sufficiently large free‐riding incentives and a medium level of mutual reliance, this equilibrium exhibits a curse of profitability: An increase in the partnership's output may strictly harm all the players. Another main finding is that Pareto improvement can be achieved if any player commits not to exit first.