The Role of Information in Collective Decisions
通过理论和实验研究，发现群体成员在事前分歧大、事后分歧小时更倾向于投票获取公共信息，讨论了该结果对国家促进进步和群体智慧价值的启示。
Abstract We study how members of a group vote for public information. We argue, both theoretically and experimentally, that voters are more likely to vote for information to be acquired relative to their own individual willingness to pay for information when ex-ante disagreement is higher and ex-post disagreement is lower. Ex-ante and ex-post disagreement refer to the disagreement among group members over the best policy for the group to follow before and after information is acquired, respectively. We discuss how the results inform the debate over the role of the State in fostering progress, and the value of the wisdom of the crowd.