Willingness-To-Pay versus Administrative Hurdles: Understanding Barriers to Social Insurance Enrollment in Thailand
研究泰国一项为临时工提供大额激励参保的政策，发现激励使参保率从6%升至73%，但12个月后仅13%续保，表明低参保率源于保险价值评估低而非行政障碍。
Abstract Many social insurance programs have low take-up, but it is unclear whether this is due to administrative barriers, information, or low insurance valuations. We study a Thai policy that offered large incentives for informal workers in selected provinces to enroll. The incentives increased insurance coverage by 67 percentage points- from 6 percent of informal workers to 73 percent- within two months. However, 12 months later, only 13 percent remained insured. Using choices among insurance tiers to back out revealed valuations, we find that low social insurance enrollment may be due to low ex-ante valuations of insurance, rather than administrative barriers.