Dissolving an ambiguous partnership
通过实验研究两个合伙人在资产价值模糊（来自埃尔斯伯格瓮）时如何解散合伙，比较三种机制，发现K+1拍卖效率最高，而自由谈判常导致分歧。
Two partners try to dissolve a partnership that owns an asset of ambiguous value, where the value is determined ex post by a draw from an Ellsberg urn. In a within-subject experiment, subjects make decisions in three different bargaining mechanisms: unstructured bargaining, the Texas shoot-out, and a K + 1 auction. We find that the K + 1 auction is the most efficient mechanism, which is in line with theory. Free format bargaining yields a surprising number of disagreements, which are not usually observed when the partnership has a certain or risky value.